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INTRODUCTION
"The future of Colombia cannot consist of either indefinite war or the
exploitation of the nation's wealth, nor can the shameful sell-out of
our sovereignty to the voracity of the United States government's im-
perialist policies continue. "'-Manuel Marulanda V61ez
Colombia is a nation with a history of violence and political turmoil
that has often resulted in its political and socioeconomic instability.2
This is evidenced through the culture of violence that has pervaded
the society since the end of World War . 3 The homicide rate in Co-
lombia in 1983 was 24 for every 100,000 people.4 By 1993 the rate had
increased to 88 for every 100,000 people.' The most recent data re-
ports that in addition to those killed in the political conflict, 30,000
people are murdered in Colombia each year.6 The increasing murder
rate represents the complexity of Colombia's myriad problems while
the Colombian government continued its efforts to hunt down the
known leaders of the cocaine drug cartels in the nation.7 From the
start, dealing with the social and economic problems facing Colom-
1. Open letter from Manuel Marulanda V6lez, FARC leader, to the Colonels of the Co-
lombian Army, Divisions, Brigades and Battalions (Oct. 12, 2003), available at http://
www.farcep.org/pagina-ingles/Comunics.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
2. Luz E. Nagle, Placing Blame Where Blame is Due: The Culpability of Illegal Armed
Groups and Narcotraffickers in Colombia's Environmental and Human Rights Catastrophes, 29
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. POL'Y REV. 1, 5 (2004); FRANCISCO E. THOUMI, EL IMPERIO DE LA
DROGA: NARCO-TRAFICO, ECONOMIA Y SOCIEDAD EN Los ANDES 263 (2002), available at http:/
/www.urosario.edu.co/FASE1/economia/documentos/thoumi-drogas-ilegales-economia.pdf (not-
ing from 1998 to 1999, there were 60 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, a ratio ten times
higher than that of the United States). Despite government efforts to quell the violence, by
2001, there were 64.64 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Colombia. United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, Country Profile Colombia 2003 at 31, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdU
colombia/Colombia%20Country%2OProfile%20version%20final%20julio%202003.pdf.
3. See generally ROBERT H. Dix, COLOMBIA: THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF CHANGE
(1967) (providing a historical context of "La Violencia").
4. KIM CRAGIN & BRUCE HOFFMAN, RAND NAT'L DEF. INST., ARMS TRAFFICKING AND
COLOMBIA, 8 (2003).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Nagle, supra note 2.
2006]
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bian citizens, the bureaucracy was never able to come to grips with the
escalating situation. Warring guerilla factions represented powerful
elements in the nation that had to be respected if there were to be any
hope of true peace and stability.8 The United States, being the sole
economic, political, and military power in the hemisphere, largely ig-
nored Colombian turmoil exacerbated by the surge in cocaine produc-
tion.9 This facile ignorance of the situation went on until the problem
had become so pervasive and pandemic that it could not be set aside
as simply a third world matter.10 The threat to the regional security of
the United States created the need for a new rhetoric to combat the
drug problem in the nation of Colombia because of its destabilizing
and perceived communism-inducing effects." As a result of the U.S.
regional interests in preventing communism, the rise of drug cartels
came into play on the world scene.'"
The South American nation of Colombia has a unique position in
U.S. foreign policy, and it has presented the United States with a
range of unforeseen political, strategic, and economic problems that
will be explored and deconstructed using a Critical Race Theory
lens.' 3 The continued political and social rebellions to the rule of law
lead to the creation of "Plan Colombia," a purported solution to all of
Colombia's problems. From 1980 until the end of the twentieth cen-
tury, Colombia was governed by three different administrations with
inconsistent policies toward political and social issues.
This article will be organized into four parts: PART I discusses the
culture of violence in Colombia. PART II reviews the three major
guerilla factions in Colombia and their organizational goals and struc-
ture. PART III addresses the U.S. and Colombian responses to the
violence. PART IV explains the U.S. military and policy approach
from a Critical Race Theory perspective.
8. James J. Brittain, The FARC-EP in Colombia: A Revolutionary Exception in an Age of
Imperialist Expansion, MONTHLY REV., Sept. 2005 at 20, available at http://
www.monthlyreview.org/0905brittain.htm [hereinafter FARC].
9. RUSSELL CRANDALL, DRIVEN By DRUGS: U.S. POLICY TOWARDS COLOMBIA 1 (2002)
(noting that prior to 1982 Colombia was not a policy priority).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. For an overview of critical legal studies, see generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN
STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2001); CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A
READER (Adrian Katherine Wing ed., 1997); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE
(Richard Delgado ed., 1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND
THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS
THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1993); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79
VA. L. REV. 461 (1993).
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A. Thesis
The problem that Colombia faced from 1980 until the end of the
twentieth century was the violence facilitated, in part, by the U.S. gov-
ernment's indifference to the rise of the drug cartels and trade."4 Ad-
ditionally, U.S. policy leading up to and including Plan Colombia
would not seek to understand the history of violence in order to solve
the crisis, but to wage a war against drugs constituting a larger under-
lying problem in Colombia.' 5 In examining the U.S.-Colombia drug
policy relationship, the argument will be posited that U.S. policy never
intended to combat the drug problem in a way that would politically
and economically stabilize the nation.16 The true intention of this pol-
icy was the oppression and subservience of Colombia through
violence.' 7
B. Theoretical Framework
The first method of deconstruction used in the analysis of the policy
relationship is the view of the white-over-black power relationship. 8
The second mode of analysis will be from the view of the United
14. CRANDALL, supra note 9.
15. See generally SEWALL H. MENZEL, COCAINE QUAGMIRE 55 (1997).
16. For an overview of the collateral throughout the "War on Drugs," see generally
COLETrA A. YOUNGERS & EILEEN ROSIN, The U.S. "War on Drugs": Its Impact in Latin
America and the Caribbean, in DRUGS AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 5, 8 (Coletta A.
Youngers & Eileen Rosin eds., 2005); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNITED STATES - PUNISHMENT
AND PREJUDICE: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (2000); THE SENTENCING PRO-
JECT, DRUG POLICY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2001), available at http://
www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles-publications/publications/drugpolicy_20010801/
drugpolicy.pdf; U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT FOR CO-
LOMBIA, EL CONFLICTO, CALLEJON CON SALIDA (2003); U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, BUREAU
FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (INL), INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR) (2003), http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/
2003/; EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL (1996); DRUG TRAF-
FICKING IN THE AMERICAS (Bruce M. Bagley & William 0. Walker III, eds.,1994).
17. See generally YOUNGERS & ROSIN, supra note 16, at 15-16 (arguing that the United
States overemphasized the drug war's military dimension in Latin America).
18. Anthony Paul Farley, Perfecting Slavery, 36 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 225, 235 (2004) (arguing
neosegregation as white-over-black). I agree with Farley's argument and propose that oppres-
sion through violence is an extension of neosegregation; thus, white-over-black can be under-
stood in Colombia as white-over-brown/non-Anglo-Saxon. While one could posit the European
ancestry of Colombia, that would obviate the significance of the African and Indigenous history
in Colombian national identity - a core consideration. See generally CHURCH WORLD SERVICE,
AFRO-COLOMBIANS: PROMOTING ALTERNATIVES TO VIOLENCE, DISPLACEMENT, AND IMPOVER-
ISHMENT (2004), http://www.churchworldservice.org/pdf -files/EA/ColombiaResource3.pdf
[hereinafter AFRO-COLOMBIANS]; GOLDMAN ENVIRONMENTAL PRIZE, LIBIA GRUESO (2004),
http://www.goldmanprize.org/node/106; Shelton Davis & Enrique Sanchez, Indigenous Peoples
and Afro-Colombian Communities, in COLOMBIA: THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF PEACE
(World Bank 2003) [hereinafter FOUNDATION] (providing information on the history and role of
Afro-Colombians in Colombia).
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States in the role of colonizer, 9 with the goal being to show that while
colonization has ended as a formal characterization of North over
South relationships, the underlying master-to-servant relationship has
never ceased.2 °
It is important to look at the history that would allow such rampant
and continued violence to pervade Colombian society. "La violencia"
refers to the period of fighting in the country that dates back to the
late 1940's and continued until 196421 and has continued through the
1990's.22 The violence has changed in its ideology, but the killing has
never ceased. 23 La violencia had the effect of desensitizing the Co-
lombian people to a life in which violence and the call to arms against
their fellow citizenry was the only means of creating change.24
Further examination will identify and explicate the major inconsis-
tencies the respective Colombian administrations chose and what im-
pact the failed policies of one administration had on succeeding
administrations. In the context of these presidential failures, the U.S.
government maintained a very similar response to the political and
economic turmoil spurred by the increased significance of the drug
trade.25
C. The Significance of the Article
This work is significant because the analysis will seek to evaluate
the U.S. position in Colombia using U.S. ideologies and doctrines to
determine whether they are legitimate according to their stated goals
and purposes. The perpetuation of the weak state allows for the
white-over-black body relationship to continue and creates the need
19. Anthony Paul Farley, BlackBody as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457, 492-93 (1997)
[hereinafter BlackBody]. "Oppression means, first of all, the oppressor's hatred for the op-
pressed. There exists a solitary limit to this venture of destructiveness, and that is colonialism
itself. Here the colonizer encounters a contradiction of his own: '[w]ere the colonized to disap-
pear, so would colonization - with the colonizer.' The system will simultaneously be the death
and the multiplication of its victims" (quoting Jean-Paul Sartre, Introduction to ALBERT MEMMI,
THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED at xxvii (1965)).
20. BlackBody supra note 19, at 522. In referencing the third world Fanon states, "[n]ative
society is not simply described as a society lacking in values. It is not enough for the colonist to
affirm that those values have disappeared from, or still better never existed in, the colonial
world. The native is declared insensible to ethics; he represents not only the absence of values,
but also the negation of values. He is, let us dare to admit, the enemy of values, and in this sense
he is the absolute evil." (quoting FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH at 41 (Con-
stance Farrington trans., (1963)).
21. See generally Dix, supra note 3 (providing a historical context of La Violencia).
22. JEAN JACKSON, MIT WESTERN HEMISPHERE PROJECT, REPORT ON "PLAN COLOMBIA"
FOR THE COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL AsSOCIA-
TION (2001), http://web.mit.edu/hemisphere/pubs/planc.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
23. Dix, supra note 3 at 375-82.
24. Dix, supra note 3 at 364-65.
25. YOUNGERS & RosIN, supra note 16, at 55-56.
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to maintain order, justifying U.S. de facto control of the Colombian
domestic drug policy.26
This article is unique in the field of Plan Colombia scholarship be-
cause it: (1) will shed light on the understudied field of illicit narcotics;
(2) will give credence to FARC's support to eradicate drugs; and (3)
will use Critical Race Theory to analyze the political and socioeco-
nomic reality in Colombia.
27
PART I - A CULTURE OF VIOLENCE
A. Historical Violence
The violence in Colombia is best described as "cultural genocide., 28
In his article on genocide, Jean Paul Sartre analyzed and drew shock-
ing comparisons between the state-sanctioned racism of Hitler and the
state-sanctioned violence in Vietnam - U.S. racism violently acted
out.
29
26. See generally 1 THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF LATIN AMERICA (Frank H. Colum-
bus ed., 2001) (laying out U.S. interests in Colombia).
27. For an overview of legal scholarship on Plan Colombia, see generally John Barry, Stu-
dent Note, From Drug War to Dirty War: Plan Colombia and the U.S. Role in Human Rights
Violations in Colombia, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (2002); James A. Inciardi,
The Irrational Politics of American Drug Policy: Implications for Criminal Law and the Manage-
ment of Drug-Involved Offenders, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 273 (2003); Kristen McCallion, Com-
ment, War for Sale! Battlefield Contractors in Latin America & the 'Corporatization' of America's
War on Drugs, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 317 (2005); Zachary P. Mugge, Notes & Com-
ments, Plan Colombia: The Environmental Effects and Social Costs of the United States' Failing
War on Drugs, 15 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 309 (2004); Luz E. Nagle, Colombia's
Faceless Justice: A Necessary Evil, Blind Impartiality or Modern Inquisition?, 61 U. PrITr. L. REV.
881 (2000); Luz E. Nagle, Latin America: Views on Contemporary Issues in the Region the Chal-
lenges of Fighting Global Organized Crime in Latin America, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1649
(2003); Nagle, supra note 2; David J. Pascuzzi, Note, International Trade and Foreign Investment
in Colombia: A Sound Economic Policy Amidst Crisis, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 443 (1994); Timothy
Posnanski, Colombia Weeps But Doesn't Surrender: The Battle for Peace in Colombia's Civil War
and the Problematic Solutions of President Alvaro Uribe, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STuD. L. REv. 719
(2005); Alan Seagrave, Conflict in Colombia: How Can Rebel Forces, Paramilitary Groups,
Drugs Traffickers, and Government Forces Be Held Liable for Human Rights Violations in a
Country Where Impunity Reigns Supreme?, 25 NOVA L. REV. 525 (2001); Francisco E. Thoumi,
Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom to Social Crisis, 582 ANNALS 102
(2002); William D. Shingleton, Understanding Colombia, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 255
(2001); Joshua H. Warmund, Removing Drug Lords And Street Pushers: The Extradition of Na-
tionals in Colombia and the Dominican Republic, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 237 (1999); Joseph
Weir, The Aerial Eradication of Illicit Coca Crops in Colombia, South America: Why the United
States and Colombian Governments Continue to Postulate its Efficacy in the Face of Strident Op-
position and Adverse Judicial Decisions in the Colombian Courts, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 205
(2005).
28. JEAN PAUL SARTRE, ON GENOCIDE AND A SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE AND JUDG-
MENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL 63 (1968).
29. See id.
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The situation in Colombia presents important parallels, principally
U.S. action as an oppressive neo-colonizer in Colombia.30 Instead of
the genocidal "kill them all" rhetoric advanced by Sartre and Frantz
Fanon, Colombia represents a different pathway in the oppressive ex-
periment. 31 A more appropriate characterization of the atrocity in
Colombia would be the policy of letting "them" kill each other, or
better yet, "help[ing] them kill one another. 32
International cooperation in violent oppression has a deep-seeded
tradition grounded in the concept of genocide.33 Sartre described the
dilemma of the colonizers when they realized that they could not rea-
sonably kill their entire disobedient, freedom-loving flock.34 Simi-
larly, in the partially-white, mostly-brown nation of Colombia, things
had to change. 35 Here, the colony, or underdeveloped nation, has cre-
ated drug addicts and criminals out of a portion of the colonizer's pop-
ulation.36  This is unacceptable. On first glance, the idea of
eradicating illicit drug production affecting the health of millions is a
noble goal. However, upon closer examination the methodology and
brutal nature of the "War on Drugs" cannot easily be overlooked.
Colombian drug production represents the bare surface of the real
issues permeating this Andean nation.37 To properly frame this arti-
cle, the question is presented: Why Colombia? And also, what exactly
is the "War on Drugs?"
The issue of drugs in Colombia is not the real problem; cocaine is
merely a symptom of a national illness. To draw the analogy to medi-
cal terminology, a symptom is defined as "[a] feature which indicates a
condition of disease, in particular one apparent to the patient. 38
Here, there is no particular individual; the nation itself is a terminally
ill patient.39 The drug pandemic is a symptom of the pathological dis-
ease of anti-black, anti-brown, anti-other sentiment.40 This section
30. See generally FRArz FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH ch.1 (Publishers Group
West, 2004) (1963).
31. See generally BlackBody, supra note 19.
32. See FANON, supra note 30, at 16.
33. SARTRE. supra note 28.
34. SARTRE. supra note 28, at 63.
35. Dix, supra note 3.
36. See generally THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 16.
37. MENZEL, supra note 15.
38. CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1459 (Elizabeth Knowles et al. eds., 2004).
39. See Nagle, supra note 2, at 104-05.
40. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Drugs Wars in Black and White, 66 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
153, 154 (2003). The lack of policy consideration is not limited to Colombia, within the United
States the war on drugs is criticized for its narrow view. ("[Tihe war would be waged far differ-
ently - or abandoned altogether - if whites were prosecuted and imprisoned more frequently
than has been the case."). Id.
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aims to shed light on the creation of the environment leading to a
"War on Drugs" - a systemic and historical Colombian violence.
1. State Sponsored Violence
The culture of violence permeating Colombia is facilitated by the
U.S. and Colombian governments. In order to better understand the
root causes of this violence, it is important to know that since 1961,
Colombia has been engaged in what amounts to a de facto war against
a large segment of its own population.41 The United States assisted
Colombia in preventing the communist guerilla movement from tak-
ing hold, as it did in Cuba.4"
U.S. military involvement has been the response to Colombia's eco-
nomic and social crisis. Foreign relations with Colombia originated as
a strategic effort to help one part of a fractured nation to militarily
oppress another.43 The scholar Charles Tilly best characterized the
fundamental flaw in this ideology when he said: "[t]he uncertain, elas-
tic line between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' violence appeared in the
upper reaches of power. Early in the state-making process, many par-
ties shared the right to make violence, the practice of using it routinely
to accomplish their ends, or both at once. 44
The United States chose to forego formulating a meaningful, cogent
policy toward Colombia until the collapse of the Soviet Union created
a rushed need to justify staying in the region. 45 The end result was the
spiraling of a nation into a fractured entity with the line between vio-
lence and civic duty blurring in distinction.
2. The Weak State Apparatus
In understanding the level of violence seen in Colombia, it is imper-
ative to understand the net effect of a weak state vis a vis the Colom-
bian government. A weak state is defined in terms of the inability of
the government to effectively protect and provide for its citizenry.46
41. See HARVEY KLINE, STATE BUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN COLOMBIA 1986-
1994 15 (1999).
42. DONALD MABRY, THE LATIN AMERICAN NARCOTICS TRADE AND U.S. NATIONAL SE-
CURITY 4 (1989).
43. YOUNGERS & ROSIN, supra note 16.
44. Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making As Organized Crime, in BRINGING THE
STATE BACK IN 173 (Peter Evans et al. eds., 1985).
45. See PETER ZIRNITE, WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, RELUCTANT RECRUITS:
THE U.S. MILITARY AND THE WAR ON DRUGS, (1997), available at http://www.tni.org/reports/
drugs/folder2/contents.htm#29b (last visited Oct. 22, 2006); See also CHARLES T. CALL, WASH-
INGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGERS: THE U.S. MILITARY AND
THE WAR ON DRUGS IN THE ANDES 32 (1991) (noting the war on drugs was described as, "their
new meal ticket now that the commies are not their big threat.").
46. In Colombia factual analysis suggests the government acted in its own interest to the
detriment of the people. See Douglas Farah, Colombia's Culpables: Drug Corruption Probe In-
2006]
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The Colombian government has historically never been able to ade-
quately provide for, protect, and secure its citizenry creating a dis-
trustful national sentiment.47 The inability of the government to
adequately respond to the basic economic and security needs of its
citizens has lead to the violence and guerilla uprisings that have be-
come commonplace.48
A natural response to the chaos of the Hobbesian "State of Nature
of Man" is survival of the fittest.49 Since non-whites were also catego-
rized as "other," letting them kill each other is not vehemently re-
jected as barbaric, after all, "they" are barbarian. 0 Citizen protection
groups evolved out of national chaos.5 1 Domestic protection groups
metastasized into Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaria de Colombia
(FARC) and others.52
The ingrained culture of violence combined with the weak govern-
ment of Colombia helped to fuel the rise of the guerilla movements
from FARC to Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional (ELN).53 The disease
of national chaos affecting the nation of "others" in Colombia pro-
vided a breeding ground for revolutionary activity allowing cocaine
exportation to thrive. 4 The effects of a weak state combined with
guerilla warfare could not be contained by the borders of the southern
hemisphere.55 Peasants were caught in the middle as victims in the
guerrillita sucia56 between the guerillas and their government. Peas-
ants were often singled out and killed by government-sanctioned mili-
tary operations for being sympathetic to the guerillas.57
Guerilla factions extorted protection money from the peasantry to
ensure the security of their families and farmland.58 Having no choice
plicates Entrenched Ruling Class, WASH. POST., Aug. 23, 1995, at A25. Colombian administra-
tions voluntarily traded power and influence in exchange for drug money. See id.
47. Luis Javier Orjuela & Christina Barrera, Narcotrdfico y Politica en la Dcada de los
Ochenta, in Narcotrafico en Colombia: Dimensiones Politicas, Economicas, Jurdicas e Interna-
tionales 209 (Carlos G. Arrieta et al. eds., Tercer Mundo Editores 1989).
48. See CALL, supra note 45, at 12, 37.
49. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 43 (Penguin Classics 1981) (1660) (noting the idea that
man would be able to invade everyone else).
50. See SARTRE, supra note 28, at 64.
51. Cecilia Lopez Montano & Arturo Garcia Duran, The Hidden Costs of Peace in Colom-
bia, in ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT, 78-158 (Andres Solimano ed. 2000).
52. KLINE, supra note 41, at 18. See generally DANIEL P8CAUT, GUERRA CONTRA LA SOCI-
EDAD ch. 8 (2001) (noting the original social justice concerns of the guerilla groups, such as
FARC, ELN, and paramilitaries seem to be of less importance today).
53. FARC, supra note 8; WILLIAM J. POMEROY, GUERRILLA WARFARE AND MARXISM 313
(1968).
54. See id.
55. FOUNDATION, supra note 18, at fig. 3.
56. Meaning dirty little war.
57. FARC, supra note 8.
58. See PLAN COLOMBIA: CASHING IN ON THE DRUG WAR FAILURE (Cinema Libre 2003)
[hereinafter CASHING IN].
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in the matter, the peasants became the unknowing victims in the
struggle. As seen countless times in studying Colombia, the unfore-
seen consequences of policy decisions can be devastating.59
B. Unstable Democracy
The economic instability caused by constant fighting and crop de-
struction created high levels of unemployment in many parts of the
nation.6° Unemployment served as the spark for drug smuggling in
Colombia.61 Subsequently, peasant farmers who did not participate in
guerilla groups were faced with the reality of not being able to provide
for their families. 62 The exportation of cocaine, warring factions, and
a government unable to provide core services to its citizens created a
willing labor market for the major drug cartels.
The increasing number of gainfully employed coca farmers created
the "Robin Hood" image of the illicit drug industry in addition to
serving as a new livelihood for thousands of otherwise law-abiding cit-
izens. 63 The Colombian government put itself in a position to fight a
war on many different fronts while neglecting the most important ele-
ment in any nation-state - its people.64
The history and culture of violence in Colombia is an integral piece
in the puzzle to understanding the lack of a stable Colombian govern-
ment. U.S. policy has been successful in presenting itself as the an-
swer to Colombia's problems. The white-over-black relationship,
however, can be found when closely examining the rhetoric of the op-
pressor: the "others" need our help; many will die when we help, but
without our help all would be lost; do as we say or we will have to
destroy all.65
59. See CHALMERS JOHNSON, BLOWBACK: THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN
EMPIRE, 5 (2000) [hereinafter BLowBACK].
60. In saying "parts of the nation," I am referring to the Putumayo regions of the country
that is made of a majority of Afro-Colombians and coincidently the most bio-diversified and
valuable parts of Colombia. See CASHING IN, supra note 58.
61. Id.
62. Id. (noting that Plan Colombia was originally intended to focus primarily on crop re-
placement and overall economic development programs; however, the Pentagon changed the
plan. The altered plan, amounting to $1.7 billion, called for eighty percent of the money to be
spent for military purposes and twenty percent to focus on crop replacement and community
development).
63. MABRY, supra note 42, at 60.
64. Id.
65. Indeed millions of peasants have been destroyed or become displaced refugees as a
result of Plan Colombia. CASHING IN, supra note 58. By exporting U.S. interests through foreign
policy such as Plan Colombia, oppression has spread beyond the confines of domestic borders.
See THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE: THE ORIGIN OF RACIAL OP-
PRESSION IN ANGLO-AMERICA 32, 34-35 (1994) (Racial oppression is imbedded in the history of
colonial ism to reduce the oppressed to one common group lacking societal status. Further it has
2006]
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Gustavo Gorriti correctly illuminated the point that guerilla insur-
gencies test the assumptions held by the democratic process and pro-
voke the elected government to overstep its legal and ethical
boundaries in an effort to be effective.66 The danger which Gorriti
accurately characterized is the blurring of the lines to the extreme ex-
tent where the protagonist becomes the antagonist.67 Colombia, aided
by U.S. gunships, M-16's, and death squads has reached this worri-
some position.68
Assistance packages such as Plan Colombia, extradition treaties,
and military aid served one major purpose: increasing Colombian reli-
ance on foreign funds and forcing respective administrations to fight
their problems on U.S. terms.69 One-dimensional policy approaches
created fertile ground for the possibility of Fanon's Algeria or Presi-
dent Johnson's Vietnam quagmire. 70 The evidence of the true posi-
tion of the United States becomes apparent by examining the
language of Plan Colombia and the terms and conditions of military
assistance. Congress used reward-and-punish appropriation packages
between 1985 and 1987.71
This section answers the questions presented supra. Why Colom-
bia? And why the "War on Drugs?" It posits that existing violence
was the key factor in the war on drugs because the state was already
weakened, creating a fertile environment for U.S. oppression.72 The
weak Colombian government ensured foreign assistance would be ac-
cepted as the only viable option for fledgling administrative power.
been used as a system of rule to derail the normal course of development allowing for natural
social distinctions.).
66. Gustavo Gorriti, Latin America's Internal Wars, 2 J. DEMOCRACY 85, 86-87 (1991).
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See CASHING IN, supra note 58. The increase in aid, in the form of arms, has lead to the
need to continue war. Id. Further, after the passage of the $1.7 billion aid package, Plan Colom-
bia, U.S. Congressional debate was not based on efficiency of the spending plan. Id. The debate
for giving aid to Colombia centered on how many and where the Black Hawk Choppers would
be built; the Seqworski Corporation (makers of the Black Hawk) made $250 million from the aid
package to Colombia. Id. U.S. Senator Janice Schakowski said, "[t]his is an under-the-radar
'secret war' that the United States is engaged in." Id.
70. See generally id.; SARTE, supra note 28.
71. MENZEL, supra note 15.
72. Oppression here has come in the form of violence, poverty, and millions of slaughtered
innocents. BlackBody, supra note 19; WALTER JOHNSON, SOUL BY SOUL: LIFE IN SIDE THE AN-
TEB3ELLUM SLAVE MARKET 115-16 (1999) (Whiteness becomes meaningful only when there is a
contrasted, un-entitled entity. Whiteness therefore, needs a subaltern: poverty, race classifica-
tion, or all things Not White, so as to sustain its special significance within the social structure.).
See BlackBody, supra note 19 at 531 ("Whiteness is not a color, it is a sadistic pleasure in
humiliating.").
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The "War on Drugs" fit nicely into the overarching U.S. strategy of
regional domination.73 Here, domination by policy pundits in Wash-
ington is the equivalent of oppression.74 The oppression of the
"other" by the Anglo-American power apparatus solidified the
subordinate status of Colombia as a nation of brown people.75
From a U.S. perspective, the war against illicit narcotics could be
easily grafted upon the skin of Colombia because its pre-existing cul-
ture had already been primed by years of civil war.76 All that had to
be done was to supply the government with more equipment of op-
pression and tell it who to imprison, execute, or extradite.77
PART II - MAJOR GUERILLA FACTIONS
Rising from the rubble of oppression three major guerilla groups
emerged that continue to dominate the geo-political landscape of Co-
lombia.78 The first is ELN, Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional.79 The
second, FARC, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia,
sprang from the turmoil of the La violencia period." Finally, vicious
paramilitary groups formed.
73. As articulated in CASHING IN, supra note 58, the "War on Drugs" served as a pretext for
U.S. involvement to supposedly help fight alleged narco-terrorists. Id. The reality is that the
rhetoric of Plan Colombia has been broadened in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror
attacks in the United States. Id. Currently, the "War on Drugs" has been renamed the "fight
against counter-insurgency." Id. For further reading on the change in U.S. rhetoric, while main-
taining the pre-text for involvement, see generally Marfa Clemencia Ramfrez Lemus Et al., Co-
lombia: A Vicious Cycle of Drugs and War, in DRUGS AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE IMPACT OF U.S. POLICY 115-16 (2005).
74. BlackBody, supra note 19.
75. JOHNSON, supra note 72 (emphasizing whiteness).
76. Dix, supra note 3.
77. See generally supra note 27 (providing a list scholarly works analyzing the many human
rights abuses arising from the implementation of U.S. policy through Plan Colombia).
78. ANGEL RABASA & PETER CHALK, COLOMBIAN LABYRINTH: THE SYNERGY OF DRUGS
AND INSURGENCY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY 23, 30, 53 (2001).
79. The ELN's most notable early leader was the former Roman Catholic priest, Camilo
Torres, who, by the mid-1960s, was a widely-known figure in the Liberation Theology movement
that swept through Latin America. After Torres' death in combat in 1966, another Spanish
priest with ties to the Basque separatist movement, Manuel Perez, assumed leadership of ELN.
Momentos en la vida del Comandante Manuel Perez, http://www.nodo50.org/patrialibre/iden-
tidad/se-melvd.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Momentos].
For more information on ELN's exclusion from the drug business due to the philosophical
preferences of its leader priest, see Momentos, supra. For information on ELN cells' involve-
ment in the drug business during the 1980's in the Catatumbo region, see COLOMBIA OBJECTIVA,
El ELN y Las FARC Intimidan a los Indigenas Motilon- Bar( para Sembrar Hoja de Coca y
Exportar Cocaina, http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHillILobby/6882/tres.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2006) [hereinafter Colombia Objectiva].
80. FARC, supra note 8.
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 [2006], Art. 6
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol29/iss1/6
110 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:98
A. ELN, Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional
A unique characteristic of the ELN is that it bases its historical and
theoretical philosophy on its founder, revolutionary priest Camilo
Torres Restrepo (Torres).8 Torres viewed the violence in Colombia
in a way that can be analogized to the genocide discussed by Sartre.82
The violence experienced by Torres was multi-dimensional.83 Torres
experienced the extreme poverty and oppression of the Colombian
majority and interpreted this through the lens of nationalized geno-
cide or violence.84  The violence of hunger, helplessness, un-
derdevelopment, persecution, oppression, and ignorance could be
understood in their relation to the exploiting minority - societal
elites.85
The enemy of the people, to Sartre, was not only imperialistic na-
tions but, more importantly, what imperialism represented.86 In his
work Populorum Progressio, Pope Paul IV talked of the economic op-
pression of the "other," in this instance non-whites, indicating "profit
as the chief spur to economic progress, free competition as the guiding
norm of economics, and private ownership of the means of production
as an absolute right."87
The rhetoric of revolution against the state in Colombia was born
out of the frustration of justice-minded peoples.88 Torres represented
the people of god first and greater humanity second.89 While often
marginalized as radical ranting, the writings of Torres and the forma-
tion of ELN are analogous to the community participation in Viet-
nam.9" In On Genocide, the average peasant became a part of the
81. Id.
82. Compare id., and SARTRE supra note 28.
83. See generally SARTRE, supra note 28.
84. CAMILO TORRES & JOHN GERASSI, REVOLUTIONARY PRIEST; THE COMPLETE WRIT-
INGS & MESSAGES OF CAMILO TORRES 442 (1971).
85. Id. at 442, 443.
86. SARTRE, supra note 28, at 85 ("In this sense imperialist genocide can only become more
complete. The group which the United States wants to intimidate and terrorize by way of the
Vietnamese nation is the human group in its entirety.").
87. CATHOLIC CHURCH, POPULORUM PROGREssIo: ENCYCLICAL LErTER OF His HOLINESS
PAUL VI ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLES 44, 46 (1967), available at http://www.vatican.va/
holy-father/paul-vi/encycicals/documents/hfp-vi-enc_26031967-populorumen.html.
88. See Momentos, supra note 79.
89. See TORRES, supra note 84, at 445.
90. "Thus war, seen in a new light and distorted by propaganda, becomes the ethical deci-
sion of the whole community. All citizens of each warring nation (or almost all, after they have
been manipulated) are the enemies of all those of the other country." SARTRE supra note 28, at
60. The extent of violence has become so warped that the Colombian elite, the government, is
beholden to buy more weapons to kill its own people, down to the last man, woman, and child.
CASHING IN, supra note 58 (quoting a peasant woman in the village of Putumayo recounting a
Colombian military and paramilitary coordinated attack on her village). For evidence of the
exclusion of the violence committed by the Colombian government against its own citizens, see
James Wilson, Brutal Battle for Territory as Colombia Prepares Offensive Against Rebels, FINAN-
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revolutionary movement, either passively or actively, bound by the
singular goal of expelling the oppressor. 9'
The call to armed struggle by ELN doctrine can be characterized as
a written manifesto stating the need for bloodshed. 92 ELN became
entangled as a guerilla group against the Colombian government, not
as actors for drug cartels, but as people for civility and humanity
through necessary counter-violence. 93 Torres explained that "[t]he
revolution is like an individual with a plastic bag over his head break-
ing free to breathe." 94
"Historically, progress has always come about through violence." 95
Brotherhood is violence through the destruction of the master-slave
relationship, creating collectivism. 96 The elite perceive rebellious
movements as terrorist organizations. 97 To the "others," rebellion
represents an act of counter-violence.98
The United States, through the singular view of the "drug war," ig-
nored the socio-economic and political turmoil responsible for creat-
ing guerilla factions. For the guerillas, the Colombian government
represented a society based on greed, competition, and murder.9 9 The
American presence has expanded murder as white over non-white op-
pression through indirect invasion and occupation. 10
B. FARC, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
To contrast the Marxist revolutionary ideals of the ELN, FARC
emerged as the second dominant guerilla faction in Colombia.10'
Drug war rhetoric grouped all guerilla factions as a collective unit op-
CIAL TIMES (London), Sept. 13, 2000, at 5 (reporting that the Putumayo region of Colombia has
been hotly contested by illegal armed groups vying for control of a region where coca and opium
are cultivated, with FARC exerting hegemony over the region, and that similar violent land
grabs by illegal armed groups is ongoing throughout Colombia).
91. See SARTRE, supra note 28, at 66.
92. See id. ELN was formed by urban intellectuals who were influenced by the pro-Soviet
Partido Comunista de Colombia (PCC), the Communist Party of Colombia, and who embraced
the ideological sentiments and financial support of the Castro revolution in Cuba. Haydee Ma-
rin, Terrorist Groups Inspired by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, LA NUEVA CUBA, http://
www.lanuevacuba.comlarchivo/notic-01-10-911.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
93. See SARTRE, supra note 28, at 66; Momentos, supra note 79.
94. TORRES, supra note 84, at 448 app. D, adapted from John Gerassi, Violence, Revolution,
and Morality, PERSPECTIVE (Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh Theological Seminary) Spring 1969, at 49.
95. Id. at 447.
96. Id. at 448.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 449.
99. Id. at 450.
100. See generally note 65 (discussing the societal role that whiteness plays in oppression,
violence, and poverty).
101. RABASA & CHALK, supra note 78 at 23.
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erating for drug trafficking purposes."° An important distinction
should be made between FARC's ideology, which originated from a
peasant protection group, and the socialist ideological viewpoint of
ELN. While both guerilla groups are fighting against the United
States by using direct action against the Colombian governmental es-
tablishment, key ideological differences exist. 103
For the U.S. and Colombian governments seeking financial support
for genocide, FARC provided the perfect justification."° The practi-
cality of direct combat against the government created serious finan-
cial needs for the 20,000-man FARC army.10 5 The reality today is that
the organization taxes the illegal drug distribution trade in order to
raise revenue to support its large forces. 10 6 According to the United
States, FARC is no longer a revolutionary organization seeking to free
its people from imperialist oppression, but rather a group composed
of narco-terrorists. 7 FARC, interestingly enough, maintains a web-
site in multiple languages that allows the entire international commu-
nity access to its ideological constructions and political positions.10 8
As the largest insurgency group in the nation its impact on Colombian
politics is undeniable. 09 It represents an undeniable threat to the Co-
lombian government's authority." 0
FARC envisions itself as a movement grounded in social justice
fighting for the people."' It calls for a legalization of drug consump-
tion as the only viable means for eliminating narcotics traffic in
Colombia." 2
The FARC proposal, vilified in the media, may provide a viable so-
lution to the drug trafficking issue.113 In analyzing its proposition the
question is presented: What if it is right? Currently the situation in
Colombia, premised on the eradication of drug trafficking, makes le-
galization appear a viable policy alternative.
102. Id. at 23-24.
103. Id.
104. See generally id. at 26 (discussing the economic and political role of coca production).
105. See generally id. at 27 (enumerating the components of FARC's structural framework).
106. Id. at 32.
107. See id. 23-29. This categorization allows for an oversimplification of the situation, it also
allows for congressional dollars to be allocated from the Plan Colombia "war on drugs" effort to
the counter-insurgency effort. CASHING IN, supra note 58.
108. FARC, supra note 8.
109. See generally The History of the Guerilla Movement in Colombia, available at http://
www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/7078/g.txt (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (arguing that guerilla fac-
tions now exercise governmental duties in rural areas, and are stronger than ever due to govern-
mental oppression of legal political activity and a lack of international pressure).
110. See id.
111. FARC, supra note 8.
112. FARC-EP, http://www.mondofariano.org/pagina-ingles/plenum/drugs.html (last visited
Nov. 17, 2006).
113. See CASHING IN, supra note 58.
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1. Staying the Course
The legalization argument is vehemently rejected by Washington,
which will only support a policy to stay the course even in the face of
twenty-five years of failed one-dimensional policy.' 4 The brave few
who have spoken out against the increasing insanity of continuing this
policy have been marginalized as supporters of drug use, soft on
crime, and anti-democratic. On its surface, resistance to change in
drug policy is premised upon the idea that to "soften" the U.S. re-
sponse will lead to a total destruction of our society by drugs.115 If
that is what the policy is trying to prevent, it is already beyond that
tipping point. On the streets of Boston, Massachusetts, heroin and
cocaine can be bought for prices as low as three to four dollars a
bag.
1 1 6
2. The Path of Total Destruction
Given the history of U.S. military involvement in the nation, the
logical assumption would be that the United States would never agree
with FARC. 117 However, upon further analysis, the situation for the
United States is not as simple as source crop eradication or legaliza-
tion." 8 Plan Colombia has increased the U.S. military presence in Co-
lombia." 9 Not only has the United States provided troops, it sells
dozens of U.S. made Black Hawk helicopters to aid the Colombian
government in its war.12° The implicit conclusion is that the profit
going to defense contractors is merely incidental to helping the
Colombians help themselves.' 21 The more apt characterization is that
the United States is helping Colombians kill themselves; after all,
Black Hawk helicopters are the instruments of war, not peace.
Helping its periphery destroy itself does not benefit the United
States if the goal is anything but military escalation of the situation.
Here the same conclusion reached by the French in Frantz Fanon's
114. MENZEL, supra note 15.
115. For an understanding of Washington's rigid position, see Kurt Schmoke, Forging a New
Consensus in the War on Drugs: Is it Possible?, 10 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 351, 351-53
(2001).
116. Interview with Jonathan Scott, Executive Director, Victory Programs, in Boston, Mass.
(Jan. 11, 2006).
117. Given the entrenched policy approach of the United States, concession is not an option.
See generally MENZEL, supra, note 15.
118. Marc Cooper, Plan Colombia, THE NATION, Mar. 19, 2001, available at http://
www.thenation.com/doc/20010319/cooper.
119. See generally RABASA & CHALK, supra note 78.
120. Id.
121. See generally Kristen McCallion, War For Sale! Battlefield Contractors in Latin America
& the 'Corporation' of America's War on Drugs, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 317 (2005).
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Algeria must be reached. 122 All things being equal, there is no obvi-
ous reason that the United States would support Colombia's
destruction.
C. Paramilitary Groups
To add to the violent mix of fighting, paramilitary groups formed as
a response to traditional guerilla violence.123 The government formed
small groups, originally to hunt down cartel members; cartels formed
and funded their own paramilitary forces, to serve as death squads.124
Government paramilitaries have the express mandate to use terrorist
activities to deal with "known communist proponents. 1 25 Finally, the
peasants caught in the middle of the chaos of guerilla groups and
other paramilitary formed their own groups for regional protection. 126
This section argues FARC and ELN violence has to be looked at
critically. While each group has committed violent acts, they have
also put forth meaningful' ideas that have been brushed aside. The
real benefactor in the rise of the guerilla groups has been the United
States. The increase in violence spurred by pre-existing instability has
been fraudulently used as justification for combating FARC and ELN
as rogue organizations. The real threat can be found in the paramili-
tary groups which are government-sanctioned and continue to commit
atrocities in the name of the Colombian government. Their symbiotic
relationship with the government and drug traffickers should not be
blurred into the same category as FARC and ELN. Politically, the
United States has found it convenient to refer to the guerilla groups as
one unit when, in fact, reality is much more nuanced. The United
States has refused to deal with FARC and ELN as legitimate bodies
and has included them as being responsible for the violent acts of the
paramilitary forces.
Thus, there is no apparent end to the complexity of societal violence
experienced in Colombia. 127 The sovereignty and legitimacy of the
government has been under perpetual suspicion and skepticism from
Colombia's populace as well as from the United States.1 28 Against the
122. If they totally destroyed the country there would be no one to exploit, or more impor-
tantly, no one to produce for the mother nation cheaply. FANON, supra note 30.
123. RABASA & CHALK, supra note 78, at 53. (noting that paramilitary describes defense
forces that have some military capability).
124. NoAM CHOMSKY, Pacification, on AN AMERICAN ADDICTION, (AK Press 2001).
125. Id.
126. See RABASA & CHALK, supra note 78, at 53, 54.
127. As long as U.S. corporations continue to benefit the perverse Colombian reality, it
seems no end is in sight. CASHING IN, supra note 58.
128. Farah, supra note 46. Some argue that the political class as a whole has allowed the
drug trade to go on and accepted political contributions from drug cartels. Id. Others argue that
scandal is not a sign of reform to clear the government of the smear of the drug trade, but a
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backdrop of total societal war, the "War on Drugs" served to not only
destabilize the Colombian government but to force an increase in the
militarization of drug traffickers, citizens, and seemingly the entire
nation. 12
9
PART III - GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES
Four presidential administrations are examined in this section for
the purpose of highlighting the Colombian government's inconsisten-
cies in dealing with the drug cartels and the instability they created.
A. The Colombian Response
President Virgilio Barco came to power in 1986 and inherited the
drug cartels and the international scrutiny of Colombian affairs.130
The Barco administration approached the identification of narcotraf-
cantes131 as an issue of Colombian national security. 13' The effect of
this policy shift in Colombia meant that military force and interven-
tion could be used, in essence, to wage a war against the producers of
drugs in Colombia. 133
1. The Barco Administration
From a micro-view, the blowback felt by the Barco administration
was swift and brutal. 3 The pressure mounting from the United
States for Colombia to take a hard stance on cocaine export and pro-
duction caused a violent result. 135 On December 17, 1986, the editor
political ploy to force Samper to resign so that his accusers can gain more influence and maintain
the ties between the drug trade and the ruling political class. Id. Motes, Beams, and Drugs, THE
ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 1996, at 18 (calling for Samper's resolution as a solution to the crisis and for
the benefit of Colombia and arguing that the U.S. government has hinted that if Samper resigns,
Colombia will be certified or given a national security waiver).
129. See COOPER, supra note 118.
130. The Medellfn Cartel formed in the late 1970s as a joint venture among drug traffickers
based in Medellin, Colombia's second largest city, an industrial center, and capital of the Colom-
bian department of Antioquia. The head of the Cartel was the infamous Pablo Escobar Gaviria,
a small-time hood who rose to dominate the organization through a combination of ambition
and ruthlessness. The Cartel was responsible for horrific violence against the government
throughout much of the 1980's before the leaders were either brought to justice or killed by
national police forces supported by the U.S. government. The Cartel has been dismantled and
its place in the drug trafficking industry taken over by the cartels in Cali and in the Caribbean
coastal cities of northern Colombia. See generally PATRICK CLAWSON & RENSSELAR W. LEE III,
THE ANDEAN COCAINE INDUSTRY (1998). See also PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE,
FRONTLINE: DRUG WARS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbhlpages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/inside/
colombian.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (providing a complete history of the Medellfn Cartel).
131. Meaning narcotics traffickers.
132. SILvIU BRUCAN, THE DIALECTIC OF WORLD POLITICS 5 (1978).
133. See id.
134. BLOwBACK, supra note 59, at 229.
135. CLAWSON & LEE, supra note 130.
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of the liberal Bogotdi daily newspaper was assassinated.136 Having
been a long-outstanding critic of the cartels, he was made an example
of to those siding with the government. This assassination highlighted
the weak state of Colombia and the violent power of the narcotrafi-
cantes. The Colombian government responded with a sweep of drug
busts and raids that did little more than inflame the cartels. 13 7
The flaw in Barco's policy was the underestimation of the true
power of the cartels. 13 8 In response to government attempts to disrupt
and arrest leaders of the Medellfn cartel, the attorney general of Co-
lombia, Carlos Mauro Hoyos, was assassinated January 25, 1988.
Hoyos was seen as a threat due to his position on United States extra-
dition of Colombian criminals; he was killed as a warning to those in
government. 139 The same underlying concept found in these actions is
also present when examining the history of La violencia.14 ° When a
party or group feels it is being threatened, or its needs are not being
met, violence and force are the first remedy and this has held true for
both the state and the populace. 14 1
The inability of the Barco administration to shield even its most
senior officials from the reach of the cartels proved to be its most
significant obstacle toward dialogue and peace. 142 The Barco adminis-
tration chose to increase its military use of force against a powerful
group of its citizens who possessed nearly unlimited resources. The
back-and-forth attacks between the government and the cartels de-
136. See generally SILVIO WAISBORD. WATCHDOG JOURNALISM IN SOUTH AMERICA: NEWS,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DEMOCRACY (2000).
137. See CLAWSON & LEE, supra note 130.
138. WAISBORD, supra note 136.
139. JENNY PEARCE, COLOMBIA: INSIDE THE LABYRINTH 230-31 (1990).
140. "Perversely, our pleasure-in-submission, a pleasure which displays itself through the five
major scenes of violence, narcotics... , has lead us to an utter disregard for destruction, which,
in turn, has led us past caring about the fate of our bodies." BlackBody, supra note 19, at 534.
141. LEONIDAS GOMEZ 0., CARTEL, HISTORIA DE LA DROGA 260, 298 (1991). When the
narcotraffickers gained control of ranching land in Magdalena Medio and the Atlantic coast,
they planted illegal crops such as coca. Id. at 298. Once the guerillas put pressure on the traf-
fickers to help with their cause, the traffickers responded by creating private armies who were
happily supported by cattle ranchers that had not yet sold their property. Id. at 260, 298.
142. See Malcolm Deas, Violent Exchanges: Reflections on Political Violence in Colombia, in
THE LEGITIMIZATION OF VIOLENCE (David E. Apter ed., 1997). Malcolm Deas notes the com-
plexity of political violence in Colombia and its inability to be fully explained. He posits: "Pro-
longed violence has not convinced Colombians that only drastic solutions will work, or that any
authority is better than none." Id. at 389. While rejecting an explanation that Colombia is con-
demned to political violence by heritage alone, he does give considerable weight to the tradition
of violence as an explanation: "[o]ne can begin to isolate the peculiar nature of Colombian polit-
ical conflict in the nineteenth century. It seems to have involved more strata of the local society,
... more frequently and repeatedly .... Nor did the conflict ever resolve . . . the Liberal-
Conservative divide. I shall suggest that this peculiar nature is part of an explanation of the
persistently high level of political violence in Colombia." Id. at 354.
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fined the Barco administration and the inability of the government to
address the drug cartel issue from a military front.
2. The Gaviria Administration
Following Barco, C6sar Gaviria came into power in 1994 and chose
to follow the unsuccessful path of his predecessor and wage war
against the drug-producing cartels. However, the Gaviria administra-
tion took a major departure from Barco. President Gaviria wanted to
create more legitimacy in the struggle and shift from a military ap-
proach to one which followed the rule of law and gave local law en-
forcement and the national judiciary discretion. 43
Beginning with decree 2047, president Gaviria offered a legal mech-
anism for drug traffickers to end their production of cocaine and stop
the violence. 144 Gaviria was attempting to use creative incentives to
create a political environment in which the drug elite could confess
their crimes and face only Colombian legal redress, which was to their
advantage. 45
In the backdrop of the Colombian government's preoccupation
with stopping the Medellfn cartel, the complexity of applying interna-
tional legal and policy norms were exacerbated by the myriad interests
within and outside Colombia.146 The decentralized nature of the drug
cartels that resulted from the fall of the famed Medellfn leader Pablo
Escobar had two major consequences. First, the United States con-
stantly evaluated the efficaciousness of how Colombians should han-
dle the war on drugs through increases or restrictions of foreign aid. 147
Second, the power of drug cartels merely changed hands to shadowy
operators.1
48
3. A Shift in Policy Approach
Leading up to 1994, the presence of U.S. aid and influence was mi-
nuscule compared to the period after 1994. The major shift in Colom-
bian policy on the drug front can be understood as resulting from the
increased pressure placed on the Colombian government by the
United States beginning with the Samper Administration. 149
143. See CRANDALL, supra note 9 at 29-30.
144. Decree 2047 allowed drug traffickers to surrender, confess their crimes and be guaran-
teed reduced sentences without extradition to the U.S. http://www.presidencia.gov.co/decretos-
linea/1990/octubre/08/dec2372081990.pdf.
145. See id.
146. Jorge L. Esquirol, Can International Law Help? An Analysis of the Colombian Peace
Process, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 23, 24 (2000).
147. Id at 55.
148. See id at 35.
149. CRANDALL, supra note 9, at 39.
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President Ernesto Samper, upon taking office, took a very stiff posi-
tion on the issue of narcotics and drug trafficking under the political
coercion of the U.S. government. It must be pointed out, however,
that while the Colombian policy may have appeared to be consistent,
it was far from it. President Samper is often credited with taking the
most unforgiving military and extradition strategy of all the past Co-
lombian presidents facing the cartels. The underlying reason for this
hard-line policy position was to appease the U.S. government. The
Samper administration marked the turning point in Colombian na-
tional policy and politics. Samper politically corned into catering to
the U.S. as a result of his own corruption scandal. 150 The United
States used as leverage evidence that the Samper election was paid for
by the Cali cartel, the new kingpins in cocaine production and
export. 151
During Samper's presidency, governmental corruption was discov-
ered to be rampant. 52 An unprecedented militarization of the "War
on Drugs" had taken place with hundreds of millions of dollars of U.S.
military assistance and training. However, by the end of the Samper
presidency, cocaine exports had not slowed and Colombia was being
hurt by the rigid approach of the U.S. Congress. 53
While Ernesto Samper was seen as a thorn in the side of the United
States on the drug issue, the new president elect, Andr6s Pastrana,
was poised to be a valuable ally. President Pastrana, in a continued
effort to work collectively with the United States, proposed a broad
plan to take back Colombia from the grips of the drug cartels and
return it to the people.'54 His plan called for the Colombian govern-
ment to appropriate four billion dollars in the form of a package
called Plan Colombia, to be implemented with the support of the in-
ternational community, principally the United States. This plan of-
fered sweeping counter-narcotic initiatives designed to destroy coca
crops, coca paste and provide U.S. military logistical assistance to Co-
lombian troops. 5 5 While praised by the Colombian people on the
surface, it was quickly discovered that Plan Colombia was in fact the
brainchild of Washington.
To the discredit of Plan Colombia, it has not resulted in the reduc-
tion of cocaine production in Colombia or decreased the levels of im-
ported coca paste; what it has done is exacerbate myriad socio-
150. Id. at 5.
151. Farah, supra note 46.
152. See id.
153. CRANDALL, supra note 9, at 37. In fact, coca harvest increased. WEIR, supra note 27, at
213-14 (noting that "[b]etween 1994 and 1995 ... coca crop went up by 25 percent ...."). Id.
154. Colombia's Drug-Bedeviled Hopes of Peace, THE ECONOMIST, October 3,1998, at 39.
155. CRANDALL, supra note 9, at 148-50.
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economic problems) 5 6 On the other hand, it has proven to be a cata-
lyst to the threat of long-term Colombian regional security.a57 Chal-
mers Johnson's theory of unintended consequences has been apparent
throughout the Pastrana administration's attempts to end the cartel's
grip on Colombia.'58 The result has been the stratification of the pro-
duction and distribution processes into the neighboring countries of
Brazil and Venezuela, further complicating the Colombian drug fight-
ing efforts. 15 9
B. The United States Presidential Administration Involvement
In understanding the position of the U.S. government, the Reagan
Doctrine160 is espoused. The Reagan foreign policy perspective was
premised on the idea of "rolling back" the communist base through-
out the world, paying close attention to third world nations.' 61 While
Colombia was arguably not a prime target for the spread of commu-
nism, the possibility was there. Due largely to the issue of overall re-
gional stability and hegemony, the United States sought to become
politically involved in any nation in its hemisphere where communism
was seen as a threat.
162
1. The Reagan Rationale
The indirect threat from Moscow pushed the United States into es-
tablishing stronger diplomatic and economic links to Colombia. In an
effort to strengthen the ties between nations, the rhetoric of the "War
on Drugs" was used to polarize Congress on the drug issue. The Rea-
gan Administration declared the drug situation a matter of national
security and source country production a key policy issue.163 The
"War on Drugs" provided a legitimate reason to provide aid to Co-
lombia to fight illicit crop production, in addition to strengthening the
position of extradition of drug leaders.
156. JACKSON, supra note 22.
157. Id. at 73, 161.
158. See BLowBACK, supra note 59.
159. The "spillover" eventually lead to the creation of the Andean Regional Initiative. See
K. LARRY STORRS & CONNIE VEILLETrE, ANDEAN REGIONAL INITIATIVE (ARI): FY2003 Sup-
PLEMENTAL AND FY2004 ASSISTANCE FOR COLOMBIA AND NEIGHBORS, CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 5, 9 (August 27, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/
man/crs/RL32021.pdf.
160. See generally MARK P. LAGON, THE REAGAN DOCTRINE: SOURCES OF AMERICAN CON-
DUCT IN THE COLD WAR'S LAST CHAPTER 1-13 (1994).
161. Id. at 3.
162. Id. at 2.
163. See generally WILLIAM WALKER, DRUG CONTROL AND U.S. HEGEMONY," UNITED
STATES POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA: A DECADE OF CRISIS AND CHALLENGE (1995).
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The treaty of extradition was seen by many in the Colombian judici-
ary as a threat to its sovereignty." 6 Further, the cartels had previously
created $1.775 billion in additional tax revenue to the Colombian
economy.16 5 Until the late 1980's, the cartels were seen more as a
profitable nuisance in Colombia than an evil scourge, as they were
viewed by United States. 166
By gaining Colombian support, the U.S. Congress was able to reach
its policy goal of actively prosecuting drug exporters and garnering
political support for being "tough" on the drug issue. 167 The tough
political position of Congress was not backed up by an equally tough
domestic stance and therefore undermined the United States in the
minds of Colombians.168  The fundamental problem throughout
United States-Colombia relations was the positive impact that the
massive inflow of illicit capital and spending that resulted had on ordi-
nary Colombians.169 Job creation and increases in quality of life for
working Colombians were never taken into account in crafting policy
to eradicate cocaine exportation.1 7 0
2. The George H. W. Bush Administration
The fall of the Soviet Union impacted the way the United States
justified its interaction with Latin America. No longer could the
United States espouse the need to control communism and its sup-
porting nations as the primary reason for intervention and action on
164. See CRANDALL, supra note 9, at 85.
165. ROBERT E. GROSSE. DRUGS AND MONEY: LAUNDERING LATIN AMERICA'S COCAINE
DOLLARS 37 (2001).
166. See generally Thoumi, supra note 27.
167. See generally LAGON, supra note 160.
168. CRANDALL, supra note 9, at 150.
169. See generally GROSSE, supra note 165.
170. Carlos Urrutia, Jr., Colombia, 7 FLA. J. INT'L L. 15, 15 (1992) (stating the economic
growth of Colombia is not due to revenues from the drug trade).
Whether or not one accepts that the drug trade has helped Colombia achieve economic
growth, the drug trade also may have had a negative impact on the Colombian economy. The
President of Colombia, Ernesto Samper, stated in his 1995 State of the Nation Address, "Con-
trary to what many people believe, especially abroad, drug trafficking has created serious distor-
tions in our economic system as it has altered the relative prices of goods and services, eroded
the purchasing power of our exports, and generated undesirable pressure on our monetary sys-
tem." Pascuzzi, supra note 27, at n.20 (1994).
One must accept the fact that the cocaine trade has had and continues to have some effect on
the Colombian economy. "Colombia is the world's leading supplier of cocaine and is the source
of tons of refined cocaine, heroin, and marijuana." BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PUB. No. 7767, 6(1) BACKGROUND NOTES: COLOMBIA 5 (1994). Additionally, in 1990
the global drug industry was estimated to be worth U.S. $500 billion a year. JOHN M. MARTIN &
ANNE T. ROMANO, MULTINATIONAL CRIME: TERRORISM, ESPIONAGE, DRUG & ARMS TRAF-
FICKING 66 (1992); see also THOUMI supra, note 27 (discussing the impact of the drug trade on
Colombia).
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foreign soil. This policy vacuum was filled by the new found "threat"
of the Colombian drug producers.
171
The antagonistic approach of Congress in Colombia was predicated
on the need to produce results. The United States government, in
light of the crack cocaine epidemic taking place during the Reagan/
Bush administrations, had to take action and produce some form of
tangible results - progress had to be made. The need to not only
maintain hegemony but to provide the American people with the
sense that U.S. policy was effective, kept Colombia in a difficult politi-
cal position.172 The heavy-handed influence of the United States in
Colombian social and political affairs has been a major impairment to
the peace process attempted by every Colombian administration for
the past two decades. 173 The Colombian government has been se-
verely limited in the way it can handle any drug issue because of its
strong connection to Washington. Ensuring U.S. interests in the
short-term may prove to be the underlying problem for securing a
long-term reduction and elimination of illegal drug exports.
3. The Clinton Administration
The Clinton administration, spanning a total of eight years, in-
creased U.S. aid to Colombia in a comprehensive and massive way. In
Colombia, a $7.5 billion plan was devised to revive the Colombian
economy, promote social development, eradicate illicit crops, and
jump-start stalled peace talks. 174 Labeled Plan Colombia, supposedly
by the Pastrana administration, the initiative called for the Colombian
government to supply $4 billion, with the remaining $3.5 billion to be
provided by the international community. 75
The Clinton administration announced a $1.6 billion package in mil-
itary aid and assistance as part of Plan Colombia. 6 In the provisions
for Plan Colombia, the United States cemented its political strangle-
hold on Colombia. While the aid package was a substantial commit-
ment to Colombia's war on drugs through three years of funding, it
was not seen as sufficient in the Colombian government. 177 The influx
of U.S. military equipment, soldiers, and tactical training was the first
of its kind in magnitude.
171. See CALL, supra note 45.
172. CRANDALL, supra note 9, at 152.
173. Id.
174. Larry Rohter, Plan to Strengthen Colombia Nudges U.S. for 3.5 billion, N. Y. TIMES,
September 18, 1999, at A6.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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To understand what is going on in Colombia, one has to look be-
yond Colombia's national borders to the region. In addition to Co-
lombian military assistance, Plan Colombia also gave the United
States key leverage in the entire Andean region. Provisions of Plan
Colombia funded operations in Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela for the
stated purpose of combating the sale of drug processing chemicals to
Colombia.'78 While these nations had been selling so-called "precur-
sor chemicals" to Colombia, those sales did not justify such a large
U.S. military presence in the region. The illegal sale of precursor
chemicals to Colombia from Andean countries provided a military
and economic guise for U.S. involvement in the region.'79
The complexities of U.S. involvement in Colombia that have been
highlighted in this section are integral in understanding the role that
state actors play on the geo-political stage. Oppression has taken a
much more underhanded form in Colombia. While it may appear
Colombians are fighting the "War on Drugs" to save their country, in
actuality, they have become clients of the United States.180 The
United States, by way of Plan Colombia, has been able to successfully
stage a proxy war in its own interest while destroying the very pros-
pect for peace that Colombians value and desire.
PART IV - CRITICAL RACE THEORY PERSPECTIVE
The imperialist domination of the United States has been thor-
oughly identified and expounded upon in the preceding parts. Critical
Race Theory provides a new perspective on the relationship of power,
oppression, and subjugation of Colombia by the United States.
A. The White-Over-Black Paradigm''
In many respects the white-over-black paradigm is overtly
presented. When U.S. foreign policy is crafted using the carrot and
stick approach, the government is exerting its power as the master
over its slave. 182
In exerting its power over the brown nation (Colombia), the United
States enacts policy that can be analogized to the slave master who
takes pleasure in that which he loathes. 8 3 The fetish object here is
178. See supra note 159.
179. See Storr & Veillette, supra note 159 (highlighting a shift in overt policy toward military
regional dominance).
180. "Clients" here specifically means beholden to the billions of dollars in foreign aid. Id.;
See Rohter, supra note 174.
181. Farley, supra note 18 (noting the connection between slavery and the white-over-black
power relationship).
182. See generally id. (discussing white power over black slaves).
183. See id. at 230 (commenting that hatred of the slave becomes pleasurable).
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not the black body but a brown nation.1 84 The pleasure that the
master derives from this interaction is not only the sight of, but inter-
action with, a forbidden passion - violence. 18 5 In American society
violence is inseparable from its culture.186 The dynamic of violence in
the United States is not allowed to be overtly pleasurable, unless it is
enjoyed through a semi-reality, for example through movies, televi-
sion, or video games.' 87 The only acceptable form of violence is self-
defense.'88 In analyzing the oppression through violence of U.S. ac-
tions in Colombia, it can be understood as a form of internationalized
"neo segregation," premised upon the preservation of a white-over-
black relationship - expanded to apply to a new race of non-white
people.'89 The United States represents the violence that Colombians
should fear.'9 ° The reality this work has sought to show is that the
violence enacted by the United States has been seen not only in the
form of policy,, but in weapons such as guns, bullets, and Black Hawk
helicopters. 191
1. The Domestic Fetish as Spectacle
The violence that Colombians should fear is shared by their U.S.
counterpart, the black body.' 92 The domestic "War on Drugs" con-
sists of targeting and incarcerating the people the government claims
to be trying to protect. 93 The real goal has been the eradication of
the superfluous population of the United States1 94 - the black body.
The white-over-black spectacle - rooted in the slavery of blacks in the
United States - has traded chains for incarceration.' 95 The "War on
184. See generally FOUNDATION, supra note 18, at Tab. 28A.3.2 (charting the population of
Colombia).
185. See BlackBody, supra note 19, at 459 (exploring "the pleasure function of the black
body").
186. See generally BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE (MGM Studios 2002) (highlighting the in-
grained nature of violence in everyday American culture).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See Farley, supra note 18.
190. See generally John Barry, Note, From Drug War to Dirty War: Plan Colombia and the
U.S. Role in Human Rights violations in Colombia, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161
(noting myriad negative effects of U.S. military involvement in Colombia).
191. See generally RABASA & CHALK, supra note 78, at 22 (discussing the U.S. response to
the illegal drug trade in Colombia).
192. See generally BlackBody, supra note 19. ("The colorline, in one aspect, is comprised of
the rules of the sadomasochistic game also known to us as race relations." Id. at 459).
193. See generally Geiza Vargas-Vargas, Article, White Investment in Black Bondage, 27 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 41 (2005) (exploring continued white supremacy, the lucrative criminal jus-
tice system, and the perpetuation of black crime).
194. CHOMSKY, The Real Objectives, on AN AMERICAN ADDICTION, supra note 124.
195. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERI-
CANS 42-213 (3rd ed. 1967). "[Sllavery was widespread during the earliest known history of
Africa as well as other continents." Id. at 42.
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Drugs," through domestic legal policy, oppresses the black male body
through incarceration. 96 The American legal system creates "the
very spectacle - black criminality - upon which it relies to justify its
existence." 197
2. From White-Over-Black to White-Over-Brown
Fighting against ones nation can be overt such as Colombia's inter-
nal struggle with FARC and ELN; however, a more subtle form of
violence is also being proliferated in this instance. The subtle violence
can be exposed in nuanced U.S. foreign policy promulgated in Colom-
bia and manifested by the Colombian social elite who facilitate the
process. The United States funded wars throughout the heart of Co-
lombia, infecting the social fabric and in the process providing a
smoke screen for the openly committed economic exploitation. 9 '
The fetish object (Colombia) has been consumed by its own poison.
Poor men and boys have lined up to commit atrocities against anyone
in the name of economic advancement manifested in drug profits, paid
by U.S. citizens.'99
3. The Climax of the Master-to-Slave Relationship
Colombia, as a fetish object, has become our own private plaything
- sadistic, intriguing, and shameful at the same time.2 °° It has long
been known in the offices of the Drug Enforcement Agency that the
196. Vargas-Vargas, supra note 193.
197. ANTHONY PAUL FARLEY, Sadomasochism and the Colorline: Reflections on the Million
Man March, in BLACK MEN ON RACE, GENDER AND SEXUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 71
(Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999). In support of my argument that the black body is specifically
targeted, see Joseph E. Kennedy, Drugs Wars in Black and White, 66 SUM LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 153, 154 (2003) ("[T]he war would be waged far differently - or abandoned altogether -
if whites were prosecuted and imprisoned more frequently than has been the case."); Kenneth B.
Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the "War on Drugs" was a "War
on Blacks," 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 385 (2002) ("The definition of crime ... is emi-
nently political.").
198. This article does not seek to delve into the specifics of exploitative economic policies;
however, these policies are further impoverishing Colombia. See Peter Kiernan, US. Plays Big-
ger Role in Latin America As It Aims to Boost Non-Arab Oil Supplies, OIL DAILY, July 8, 2002,
at 496; Kirk Semple, Colombian Training Program Not Just for Guarding Pipelines, 81 PLATrs
OILGRAM NEWS, Feb. 18, 2003, at 2; Colombia's Chief Pipeline Bombed,, OIL DAILY, Nov. 25,
2002. The Cusiana-Cupiagua fields produce nearly half of the 600,000 barrels of oil produced
each day in Colombia and are operated by British Petroleum partners. The pipeline is also
owned by Total Fina Elf of France, holding nineteen percent, and Triton Energy of the United
States, a subsidiary of Amerada Hess, which possess twelve percent. Id. See also Steven Dudley,
War in Colombia's Oilflelds: Washington's Counterinsurgency Aid Will Be a Big Boost to Occi-
dental Petroleum, 275 THE NATION, Aug. 5, 2002, at 28. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
REPORT TO CONGRESS, COLOMBIA: CANO LIMON PIPELINE, http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/
02120001.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006); Pascuzzi supra note 27.
199. PAUL EDDY ET AL., THE COCAINE WARS 30 (1988).
200. BlackBody, supra note 19, at 492.
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slums of Colombia are the training ground for some of the world's
most prized assassins. 20 1 The continued expansion of the gap between
the extremely wealthy and those marginalized by abject poverty con-
tinues to grow. Can there be surprise when the abused and neglected
socio-economic lepers turn their guns upon their master? The servant
is the Colombian government beholden to Washington (master) in
one form or another for more than twenty years. When slaves (the
oppressed Colombian people) can be beaten no more, they will lash
out, driven to action by the oppressive circumstance.2 °2
Those most affected by the death and destruction of cocaine profits
have sought to minimize its influence to no avail. The complexity of
the situation allows for questioning of failed supply side methodology.
While many agree that a comprehensive plan must be taken, a real
solution - a supply and demand side reduction strategy - is never
given credence. This article does not propose to have the answer to
the problem, but rather, the goal of this article is to label current pol-
icy exactly what it is - insanity.
B. The Illicit Effect
The impact of the violence seen in Colombia and by its citizenry has
been experienced on different levels. First, the guerilla factions have
militarized the nation and created a perpetual state of violence. Sec-
ond, the United States has not seen a reduction in the demand for
drugs by its citizenry. As an economic market, the illicit trade in drugs
has become more streamlined and efficient as a result of the expan-
sion of legitimate global trade.
201. EDDY, supra note 199.
202. In Malcolm X's May 29, 1964 speech, he characterized a cohesion of oppressed people:
I visited the Casbah in Casablanca and I visited the one in Algiers, with some of the broth-
ers - blood brothers. They took me down into it and showed me the suffering, showed me
the conditions that they had to live under while they were being occupied by the French....
They showed me the conditions that they lived under while they were colonized be these
people from Europe. And they also showed me what they had to do to get those people off
their back. The first thing they had to realize was that all of them were brothers; oppression
made them brothers; exploitation made them brothers; degradation made them brothers;
discrimination made them brothers; segregation made them brothers; humiliation made
them brothers.
Malcolm X, The Harlem "Hate-Gang" Scare, reprinted in MALCOLM X SPEAKS: SELECrED
SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS 64, 66 (George Breitman ed., 2d ed. 1989) (delivered May 29, 1964,
for the Militant Labor Forum of New York). Malcolm X took the conclusion one step further, as
I believe the guerilla fighters in Colombia analogously have: "The same conditions that prevailed
in Algeria that forced people, the noble people of Algeria, to resort eventually to the terrorist-
type tactics that were necessary to get the monkey off their backs, those same conditions prevail
today in America in every Negro community." Id. Currently the level of disparity at every
measurable indicator creates the reasonable inference that one segment of the Colombian popu-
lation is also being targeted, the non-elite, non-wealthy Colombian.
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The characterization of trade as illegal has allowed for the pretext
of legitimacy from the international community and organizations. 0 3
The United States, in its role as international actor, has its hand in
promulgating trade liberalization and privatization. 2 4 The liberaliza-
tion policies of the global north have functioned to not only create the
market for illicit narcotics, but to facilitate the trade in global narcot-ics.205 The facilitation of illicit trade in narcotics has created the need
to combat the new global scourge that threatens to destroy us all - the
United States. 0 6
The master claims to help the slave purge himself of his own evil by
destroying that part of himself which is undesirable.0 7 In the process
of purging himself, the slave (Colombia) is in danger of forever losing
its sense of national identity. 0 8
CONCLUSION
A fundamental objective of U.S. foreign policy is to maintain he-
gemony and influence. Throughout the U.S. involvement in Colom-
bia, a uniform approach has been maintained: (1) attack the problem
at the source; (2) use tied aid to force Colombian policy decisions in
America's favor; and (3) never make a true effort to comprehend the
complexity of cocaine in the Colombian economy and what it repre-
sents. The Colombian government has ineffectively tried to stem the
rise in cocaine exports. The government is constrained in the way in
which it can combat drug production because the only allowable op-
tion to fight the "War on Drugs" has been military escalation.
The white-over-black power relationship can be seen in the applica-
tion of the "carrot and stick" policy by the United States. The in-
creased militarization of U.S. involvement has served to exacerbate
the potential for Colombians to kill more Colombians. The environ-
ment in Colombia has presented the ideal opportunity for violent he-
gemony to be exerted over the Colombian government. The violent
oppression in Colombia is not a result of the "War on Drugs." The
real war is against the poor, exhibited in the context of the master to
the slave.
203. See generally Chantal Thomas, Disciplining Globalization: International Law, Illegal
Trade, and the Case of Narcotics, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 549 (2003).
204. Id. at 555.
205. Id.
206. See id.
207. See Farley, supra note 18, at 234 (explaining that the only thing the living are not free to
be is dead).
208. Id.
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